WARNING (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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SUMMARY; THE PERUVIAN ARMY COMMAND GIVES AND DEMANDS FULL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT FUJIMORI. THE PRESIDENT IS BOTH LIVING AND WORKING AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

TEXT: 1. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS THE PRESIDENT OF THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES JOINT COMMAND AND COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY, GEN NICOLAS (HERMOZA) RIOS WITH TIE COMMANDING GENERALS OF THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY MET WITH PRESIDENT FUJIMORI ON 28 APR 92 TO REAFFIRM THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR HIS GOVERNMENT.

2. (S/NF). IN THE ARMY THE MAJORITY OF THE OFFICERS SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AND FEEL THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY PRESIDENT FUJIMORI WERE NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED. IN ORDER TO SHOW HIS SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT. GEN HERMOZA ORDERED A MEETING OF ALL ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS THAT TOOK PLACE ON 14 APR 92 AND A MEETING OF ALL ARMY COLONELS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON 15 APR 92. IN HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE ARMED FORCES - HE DIRECTED THAT SIMILAR MEETINGS TAKE PLACE IN TIE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY. THE ARMY MEETINGS EACH LASTED ABOUT TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS EACH. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE WAS TO EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE FOR THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND T0 INSURE THE OFFICERS KNEW THAT THE ARMY COMMAND FULLY SUPPORTED PRESIDENT FUJIMORI. HERMOZA ALSO STATED THAT THE ARMY WOULD BE CARRYING OUT INCREASED OPERATIONS AGAINST BOTH TERRORISM AND NARCOTRAFFICKING.

3. (S/NF). HERMOZA TOLD THE OFFICERS THAT HE EXPECTED THE SAME SUPPORT FROM EACH ONE OF THEM. HE SAID THAT IF ANY OFFICER COULD NOT SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT’S ACTIONS THAT OFFICER SHOULD REQUEST HIS RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY IMMEDIATELY. HE FURTHER STATED THAT IF ARMY INTELLIGENCE DISCOVERED ANY OFFICER WAS SUPPORTING ANY OF THE OPPOSITION GROUPS, IT WOULD NOT GO WELL WITH THAT OFFICER. FURTHERMORE ANY OFFICER RECEIVING REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT IN ANY FORM FROM ANY OF THE OPPOSITION GROUPS WAS OBLIGATED TO REPORT THE INCIDENT. HERMOZA THREATENED THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY OFFICER THAT DID NOT REPORT SUCH INCIDENTS. WHILE THE MAJORITY OF THE OFFICERS SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT, THERE ARE MANY WHO ARE UPSET AT THE THREATENING ATTITUDE OF GEN HERMOZA.

4. (S/NF) PRESIDENT FUJIMORI AND HIS SON KENJI HAVE BEEN LIVING AT THE ARMY GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SINCE APPROXIMATELY THE END OF MARCH 92. THEY ARE OCCUPYING THE APARTMENT THAT IS GENERALLY USED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SlE) WHICH IS PART OF THE FACILITIES OF SIE HEADQUARTERS ON THE FAST SIDE OF IRE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. ALTHOUGH SHE PRESIDENT COMES AND GOES DAILY TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE HE HAS ALSO TAKEN OVER AND PERIODICALLY USES THE OFFICE OF THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF LOCATED ON THE SIXTH FLOOR OF THE MAIN BUILDING AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS. SEVERAL OFFICERS HAVE EXPRESSED TO HERMOZA THAT THE PRESIDENT’S ALMOST PERMANENT PRESENCE AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS WILL TEND TO POLITICIZE THE ARMY AND THE PUBLIC WILL BEGIN T0 FEEL THAT THE ARMY IS RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT.

P 212289Z APR 92

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COUNTRY:(U) PERU (PE)

SUBJ: IIR REDACTED WORD MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE OFFICERS ALSO EXPRESS DISPLEASURE VIII THE PRESENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS WHO IS NOW A FREQUENT VISITOR AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

5. (S/NF). OFFICER SUPPORT AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS FOR "FORMER" VICE-PRESIDENT MÁXIMO ((SAN ROMAN) IS NON-EXISTENT. THE NEWS COVERAGE OF HIS RETURN THAT WAS TO BE BROADCAST ON A WEEKLY SUNDAY NIGHT NEWS PROGRAM, PANORAMA, WAS ELECTRONICALLY JAMMED BY ARMY INTELLIGENCE.

R 9717832 JUN 36

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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SUMMARY: (S) THE PERUVIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS AN OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE NETWORK COMPRISING AT LEAST 17 RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS ASSIGNED T0 PERUVIAN OVERSEAS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. THE OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED IN AT LEAST SEVEN COUNTRIES: THREE ARE ACTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES.

TEXT:1. (S) THE PERUVIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIN) CREATED AN OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE NETWORK ON THE ORDERS OF SIN DE-FACTO CHIEF VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS TORRES. THE NETWORK CONSISTS OF RETIRED PERUVIAN ARMY (EP) OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO PERUVIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OVERSEAS. WITHIN THE SIN, THE OFFICERS ARE OFFICIALLY REFERRED TO AS "ENLACES EXTERNOS" (OVERSEAS LIAISON OFFICERS). THE NETWORK HAS EXISTED SINCE AS EARLY AS MID-1995.

2. (S) THERE ARE CURRENTLY SOME 17 SIN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SERVING IN THIS CAPACITY OVERSEAS. COUNTRIES TO WHICH THEY ARE ASSIGNED INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, BOLIVIA, CHILE, BRAZIL, AND SOUTH KOREA. MANY OF THE OFFICERS ARE COVERED AS COMMERCIAL ATTACHES. THREE OF THE OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED IN UNITED STATES. TWO AND A HALF REDACTED LINES.

3. (S) THE SIN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WERE ALL PERSONALLY SELECTED BY MONTESINOS AND NORMALLY PROVIDE THEIR INTELLIGENCE REPORTING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC POUCH. UNLIKE PERUVIAN MILITARY ATTACHES ASSIGNED OVERSEAS, WHOSE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING NORMALLY IS TO THEIR PARENT MILITARY SERVICE, THESE OFFICERS REPORT DIRECTLY BACK TO THE SIN.

4. (S) THE SIN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS STATIONED OVERSEAS MAKE USD 3500-7000 PER MONTH EACH, DEPENDING ON THE COUNTRY TO WHICH THEY ARE ASSIGNED.

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SECRET NO FORN

(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE JOINT PRODUCTION EFFORT OF THE U&S COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. THE CONTENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE PREPARING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.

SUBJ: PERU: COUP ATTEMPT FALLOUT. (U)

DOl: 21 DEC 92 (AS OF 1520 EST)

1. (S). OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE 13 NOVEMBER OVERTHROW ATTEMPT ARE REPORTEDLY RECEIVING HARSH TREATMENT, AND SEVERAL ALLEGED COCONSPIRATORS HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY.

3. (C). RETIRED VADM VARGAS, WHOM THE PLOTTERS PLANNED TO INSTALL AS NAVY COMMANDER, LEFT FOR CHILE ON THE 20TH AFTER HAVING SOUGHT REFUGE IN SANTIAGO’S EMBASSY IN LIMA. FOUR CIVILIANS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE ATTEMPT HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING OPPOSITION POPULAR CHRISTIAN PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL BOREA, WHO RECEIVED ASYLUM IN COSTA RICA.

4. (C/NF) COMMENT: THE ADMINISTRATION PROBABLY WORRIES THAT THE

5. (S/NF0 ALTHOUGH THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO SUPPORT OVERALL ADMINISTRATION POLICIES, MOST OFFICERS ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT’S TREATMENT OF THE COUP PLOTTERS, ADDING TO THEIR COMPLAINTS ABOUT LOW SALARIES AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN PERSONNEL MATTERS. DISCONTENT IS LIKELY TO GROW AS LONG AS FUJIMORI AND MONTESINOS ARE VIEWED AS IGNORING THESE INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS.

ADDITIONAL REVOLTS AND PLOTS ARE POSSIBLE; HOWEVER, A CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE LEADER HAS YET TO EMERGE IN EITHER THE MILITARY OR THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION.